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Abstract
This paper is a first attempt to model the eﬀects of reference pricing on the
innovation eﬀort of pharmaceutical firms. The model is based on a dynamic
game involving three types of agents: pharmaceutical firms, consumers and
a regulatory entity. The games includes research stages where the innovation
eﬀorts by the firms are determined and introductory stages where a price
for a new medicament is fixed. We model the negotiation between the drug
owner and the regulator to fix the price, first without legal constraint, second
under the regime of reference pricing in therapeutic classes. We then solve
the innovation game where the firms anticipate the results of the negotia-
tion round on prices. We thus consider the eﬀect of the therapeutic class
regulation on both prices and the innovation pace. The final stage consists
in calibrating the model with a small data on anti-statine in France and
simulates the eﬀect of the change in regulatory regime.
Keywords: innovation, mee-too, reference pricing, pharmaceutical lab-
oratories.
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1 Introduction
Pharmaceutical expenditures have dramatically increased in most of devel-
oped countries during the two last decades. In United States for example,
spending on outpatient grew at a rate of 17 percent in 1999 whereas total
health expenditure only grew at a rate of 3.3 percent during the same year
(Danzon and Pauly, 2002). As it is noticed by these two authors, this trend
in drug spending is related to the growth in drug coverage. According to
Weisbrod (1991), more health insurance coverage implies a higher rate of
R&D and technological change in health sector that generates more health
expenditures which increases the demand of coverage. Danzon and Pauly
explain the relation between coverage and drugs spending by the reverse ef-
fect: the growth of drug spending comes from technological change in health
sector and the extent of coverage.
Two main theories dealing with patients’ overconsumption can explain
the Danzon and Pauly’s point of view. The first-one is the ex post moral
hazard theory described by Pauly (1968), the fact that health care spending
increases with health insurance coverage. The second theory that aims at
explaining health care overconsumption is the supply induced demand (SID)
revealed by Rice (1993). In this theory, it is postulated that health care con-
sumption decisions come from physicians and do not really result from pa-
tients’ choices. In despite of their opposite assumptions, recent models such
as Ma and McGuire (1997) and Eggleston (2000) combine both eﬀects i .e ex
post moral hazard and SID behaviors. They show that incentives have to be
splitted between physicians and patients, the latter having to pay some co-
payments. Without separate the respective roles of patients and physicians,
Danzon and Pauly (2002) estimate that ex post moral hazard behaviors ex-
plain between one-four and one-half of the increase in drug consumption.
Nevertheless, ineﬃciencies generated by patients’ overconsumption can be
reduced by increasing the share of the health care expenditure through co-
payment mechanisms.1
In this line of thought, over the last few years, several countries - starting
with Germany - have adopted the principle of drug reimbursement based on
therapeutic equivalence (TE). Simply put, drugs are divided into diﬀerent
1See for example Zeckhauser (1970), Manning and Marquis (1996) and Blomqvist
(1997).
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classes according to their active agents and the pathologies they are supposed
to treat. All drugs within a given therapeutic class are reimbursed on the
same basis. Thus, for any drug consumed, and whatever the price paid by
the patient, the latter receives a reimbursement which depends solely on the
therapeutic class to which the drug belongs. Manufacturers remain free to
set their prices and the part of drugs consumption paid by policy holders
is, under the traditional form of reference pricing, the diﬀerence between
prices set by laboratories and the reference price (RP), multiplied by the
copayment rate applied in their health insurance contract.2 Obviously, the
introduction of therapeutic equivalence explicitly aims at reducing public
expenditure and more precisely ineﬃciencies generated by patients’ health
care overconsumption.
Prescriptions, especially prescriptions of high quality drugs, are clearly
one way for physicians to induce patients’ demand. To limit this kind of
behaviors, RP is a manner to introduce additional copayments into patients’
drugs consumptions, letting the couple patient-physician in front of a trade-
oﬀ between cost / quality. Actually, RP allows to provide incentives for cost
conscious use of resource (Danzon, 2003).3 Indeed, Bardey and Lesur (2006)
show how copayments influence physicians’ ability to induce demand. Con-
fronted to a RP mechanism, the couple patient-physician may choose cheaper
drugs i .e. mee-too products or generics in order to reduce patients’ bills. In
Germany, since 1997, physicians prescribing drugs with a price above the
RP have to explain to their patients motivations of their prescriptions. In
Germany, two-third of physicians admitted that they change their prescrip-
tions after the introduction of RP and substitute more often brand-name
products by generics. Obviously, in case of important vertical diﬀerentiation
due to an imperfect substitution between drugs, such therapeutic referencing
can be ineﬃcient if patients do not take the best drugs available to treat
their disease and moreover introduces some inequity aspects. Danzon and
Liu (1996) explain that with this kind of regulation, the demand for drugs
is kinked at the reference price. When they have to pay some copayments,
patients demand is elastic for price above the RPs, the elasticity depending
2See Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2000) for more details on RPs’ characteristics.
3Ex post moral hazard phenomenon is sometimes presented as a contract incompleteness
problem in the sense that health risk is too complex to plan some lump-sum payments in
each state of nature. In response to this point, if we ignore quantity eﬀects, RP can be
viewed as a manner to introduce lump-sum payments for each pathology.
2
of drugs substitutability degrees, and inelastic for price below.
Obviously, physicians prescriptions and pharmaceutical firms strategies
are linked. Confronted to a RP regulation or generics entry, manufacturers
can have two possible reactions. The first-one is an increase of brand-name
drugs prices. Scherer (1993) explains this phenomenon by a loyalty to brand-
name drugs. Prices increase may be interpreted as a manner to increase
the diﬀerentiation with mee-too products or generics.4 Frank and Salkever
(1992) show that prices increase if the reduced demands of brand-name drugs
become more elastic. Nevertheless, in a vertical diﬀerentiation framework,
Castello (2003) show that brand-name drugs prices decrease when a RP
regulation is introduced. Besides, in countries which have introduced RP
regulation, Danzon and Liu (1996) and Danzon (2003) observed that brand-
name drugs prices have been reduced. Manufacturers reduces prices of their
drugs to limit losses of market share due to generics’ competition. Moreover,
Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2005) revealed that even brand-name drugs prices
increase, their average price diminishes thanks to a substitution eﬀect toward
the cheapest brand-name drugs.
In the long run, the existence of drugs cannot be considered exogenous.
Drugs arrive on the market as a result of long and costly R&D processes
which are undertaken only if the expected profits are suﬃciently high. To
resume the Weisbrod’s point of view,5 since the introduction of therapeutic
equivalence reduces policy holders’ coverage, it negatively aﬀects R&D in
pharmaceutical sector. Indeed, pharmaceutical companies’ profits decreas-
ing, it reduces their incentives to innovate, which means less medical research,
less innovation, and ultimately fewer drugs. However, one should not con-
clude from this that drug supply will deteriorate in a uniform way. When
pricing based on therapeutic equivalence is implemented, the overall level of
incentives to innovate is of course reduced, but the structure of innovations is
also profoundly changed. The introduction of therapeutic equivalence causes
a decline in the intensity of research, but also a reorientation of research.
In particular, pricing according to therapeutic classes could increase or de-
crease incentives to do research on drugs which are similar to those already
4Mestre-Ferrandiz (1999) and Scherer (1996) explain this phenomenon in a horizontal
diﬀerentiation framework whereas Cabrales (2003) obtains the same result in a vertical
one.
5Weisbrod (1991).
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present in the market, thereby increasing or decreasing incentives to conduct
research on fundamental innovations which have the strongest eﬀects on wel-
fare. The literature is particularly ambiguous on this point, and conflicting
arguments have been put forward. For example, one can argue that once a
drug exists in a given therapeutic class, there is little incentive to innovate
within that class, since the new drug would be reimbursed at the same rate
as the old one (and would therefore hardly sell if it is more expensive). This
eﬀect is of course worsened when drugs in a therapeutic class are no longer
protected by patents. There would thus be a disincentive to develop follower
products, and a premium for very innovative drugs. But the opposite eﬀect
is also conceivable, in case the production of a follower turns out to be less
costly than the production of an innovative drug, or if one takes into account
that the introduction of a follower has a radically diﬀerent eﬀect on the sales
of the older drug depending on whether or not reimbursement is based on
therapeutic equivalence. Moreover, we have to take into consideration that
therapeutic classes can be more or less broad. Drugs within the same ther-
apeutic class may diﬀer in quality and eﬃciency. Hence, reducing incentives
for research on drugs which would be classified as belonging to an existing
therapeutic class could in itself have a strong negative impact on medical
innovation and welfare.
To sum-up, the literature reveals three potential eﬀects of a regulation
built on reference pricing: a quantity eﬀect through a reduction of ex post
moral hazard and SID behaviors, a price eﬀect according to laboratories
reactions and technological change. In this paper, we focus on the two last
eﬀects. More precisely, the goal of our modeling eﬀorts described below is to
determine the main eﬀects of reference pricing on the structure of incentives
to innovate according to the type of prices setting. Section 2 presents the
hypothesis of the model. In Section 3, we analyze the negotiation between the
drug owner and the regulator to fix the price, first without legal constraint,
second under the regime of therapeutic classes. Section 4 is devoted to the
innovation game where the firms anticipate the results of the negotiation
round on prices without and with the therapeutic class regulation. Section 5
discusses welfare eﬀects. In section 6 we present briefly the market for statins
in France. We then show the results from numerical simulations. We finally
concludes in section 7 and present some possible extensions of the model.
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2 Model setting
Time is continuous from 0 to infinity. The three actors of the model are
pharmaceutical firms (research laboratories and drugs producers), consumers
and the regulator of the industry. These actors intervene diﬀerently at the
two stages of the game. At the upstream stage, innovators invest in R&D
and introduce new molecules or treatments. At the downstream stage, the
regulatory agency and the producers negotiate to determine the price (the
negotiation is modeled using the Nash bargaining solution concept where the
status-quo corresponds to not introducing the new drug); knowing the prices,
patients and doctors jointly determine the consumption of drugs. All this is
done under the legal rules that have been set by the legislator, in particular
the reference pricing system. We shall consider here an extreme form that
represents the Italian version of RP.
To keep in line with the standard backward analysis, we first make explicit
the hypothesis on the downstream agents and activities. Then we give details
on the assumptions of the innovation stage.
2.1 The downstream stage: marketing
We focus on the case of a single pathology that can be treated with one of
several medicaments. At each instant in time there is a population of size 1
of patients to be treated. We take account of patients’ heterogeneity with
respect to the various treatments by assuming that the eﬀect of a given med-
ication varies among patients in terms of eﬃciency, tolerance and side eﬀects.
A therapeutic class is a set of drugs that can be used to treat the pathology,
and such that none unambiguously dominates the others. This does not mean
that the drugs inside a given class are all perfectly substitutable, but that
absent any specific information on the patient, a doctor would be indiﬀerent
between prescribing one or the other drug in the class: each has an equal
chance to be eﬀective. After examination of the patient, the doctor reaches
an objective diagnostic which allows him to know what is the most adapted
treatment.6 We consider here a relation of perfect agency between the patient
and the physician.7 Then, they are viewed as a single agent, the consumer.
As regards health expenses, we assume that the patient is fully reimbursed.
6This assumption is based on the concept of ex-post diﬀerentiation as for instance in
Gal-Or (1997 and 1999).
7We discuss in the conclusion what would change if we introduce SID eﬀect.
5
This assumption allows to emphasize one of the main issue in the debate on
price fixing for most European countries, namely the lack of price sensitivity.
Concerning the drugs consumed, we make a distinction between vertical
and horizontal diﬀerentiation. Vertical diﬀerentiation is defined by levels. In
order to simplify as much as possible the analysis, we assume that there are
two levels indexed by k = 1 or 2, and that there are at most two drugs active
in each level, i = 1 or 2.8 We adopt a discrete choice model to represent
the utility from consumption.9 When consuming medication i in level k, the
typical patient obtains an utility
U = Vk − θexki − p+R
where p is the price paid and R is the reimbursement received. The patient
being fully reimbursed, we have U = Vk− θexki . 10 The term Vk represents the
maximal value that a patient can derive from a drug in level k.We refer to it
as the base value. Each patient receives the base value minus the disutility
θexki , where exki is a random variable that is identically and independently
distributed among all consumers and drugs. We assume that the distribution
is uniform on the interval [−1
2
, 1
2
] so that we can take the ex-ante value of
a medication Vk as the reference value. Nevertheless, since doctors are able
to identify the disutility component exki , the ex-post value is Vk − θexki , which
diﬀers from the reference value by a random term θexki .
We assume that the base value takes the multiplicative form V2 = v +
V1. In other words, introducing a drug in the superior level raises the base
value by an amount v, with
Assumption 1 v > θ.
From the previous assumptions, we can derive the following demands for
medications:
1. Only drugs in the highest level available are consumed.11
8The extension to n is straightforward.
9See Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) for a presentation of discrete choice models.
10We do not include the payment for tax and insurance premium, that are independent
of consumption (at individual level).
11Indeed, consuming in class k and incurring the highest disutility is better than con-
suming in class k − 1 and suﬀering from no disutility at all: kv − t > (k − 1)v.
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2. The total demand for medication is equal to 1.
3. The demand is evenly spread between all the drugs in the same level
of the therapeutic class.
Thus a therapeutic class contains at most two drugs that are eﬀectively
consumed, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}, and a single level k = 1 or 2. Once the
innovation process is successful, the cost of producing a drug is the same for
all drugs, normalized to zero.
Knowing these characteristics of the demand and supply for drugs, the
price is fixed during a negotiation round between the regulator and the drug
owner detailed in section 2.
2.2 The upstream activity: R&D
The upstream part of the sector is composed of laboratories under the super-
vision of the regulator, whose role at this stage is limited to guarantee drug
safety. There are N (large enough) laboratories active in the research sector
of the pharmaceutical industry for the given pathology. Each laboratory is
identified with a single project.12 We assume that once a firm has innovated,
it obtains a perfect patent of infinite duration. At that time, it exits the in-
novative sector to enter the downstream market where it becomes producer
of the drug.13
The process of innovation is incremental. When a laboratory innovates,
it can either discover a new product in the same level k as existing products
(here, this occurs when there is only one product on the market), or it can
discover a product in the superior level. The former will be referred to as
horizontal innovation and the new drug as a follower. The latter is referred
to as vertical innovation and the corresponding drug as a pioneer. When
investing an amount I in R&D, the laboratory can devote an amount E to
research for a superior quality drug, and an amount e = I −E to the search
for a drug within the existing therapeutic class. If the current active level is
12This assumption is here to avoid the problem of the management of projects and
products portfolio. It also reflects the opinion among specialists that innovation by in-
dependent research unit is becoming standard in the pharmaceutical industry. Moreover,
this assumption makes sense for a pathology given (see bullet iv in the conclusion).
13Another possibility is that the laboratory sells the patented innovation to a single
producer.
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k, a laboratory investing in the vertical dimension can only have access to
level k + 1.
As regards the innovation process, we adopt a deterministic innovation
model according to which laboratories choose the time devoted to develop
the new product. This time is known in advance and the development cost
is a decreasing function of the discovery time. More precisely, the cost of
bringing a vertical innovation to the market is
C(t) = Ce−γt
where t is the time length of the research process.
Similarly, starting the process after the introduction of the first drug in
a given level k, the discovery of a new drug in the same level (horizontal
innovation) has a cost
c(t) = ce−γt
with c < C.
At the competitive equilibrium three properties hold. First, the research
projects start just after a new level k is created. Second, the time chosen for
any active research project is the time that cancels the profit of the investor.
Third, if no laboratory invests in horizontal innovation, the profit from doing
so is non-positive. The pharmaceutical laboratories being far sighted, they
anticipate correctly their future stream of income.
3 The price negotiation
We first consider the case where there is no legal constraint on the determi-
nation of the price in a negotiation round between the innovator who wants
to maximize its profit and the regulator who protects consumers. The second
subsection is devoted to the case where the negotiation is constrained by the
therapeutic-class system.
3.1 The base case
When a new drug is introduced in the market, the price is set by negotiation
between the regulator and the laboratory who produces the new molecule.
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The negotiation is depicted by the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution,
with arbitrary bargaining power, α for the regulator and 1− α for the firm.
This can be viewed as a bargaining process a la Rubinstein with diﬀerent
discount factors for the regulator and the firm. The negotiators only care
about current consumers’ surplus for the regulator and current profits for
the firm, so that the resulting price maximizes the function:
[W (with innovation)−W (without innovation)]α
× [π(with innovation)− π(without innovation)]1−α
where W is the welfare as perceived by the regulator, and π represents the
instantaneous profit generated by the sales of the drug. It is important to
notice that the R&D expenses are sunk for all agents at the time of mar-
keting. Therefore, they are not taken into account in the bargain. Here-
after, we assume that if the negotiation fails, the firm has no way to market
its innovation anywhere so that it is as if it had no innovation at all and
π(without innovation) = 0.
We denote by i = 1 the first drug introduced in level k and by p1k the
price at which it is introduced. In all what follows we assume that one drug
is already present in the level k = 1 and take p11 as given by history:
p11 = P
When a second drug is introduced in level k, it is denoted i = 2 and its
price is p2k. The welfare function is given by the aggregate utility of consumers
net of the social cost of health expenses. If λ denotes the social cost of public
funds,14 we obtain
W = Vk − (1 + λ)p1k
in the case of a single product in the class. With a single drug in the highest
level, all patients consume the same drug and welfare equals the reference
value minus the social cost of the medicament. When there are two drugs in
the highest level k, consumers are spread between the two drugs and the social
14See Laﬀont-Tirole (1993) for a discussion of the concept of the cost of public funds.
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value is the expectation of the highest value of treatment Vk − θmin{ε1, ε2}
minus the social cost:
W = Vk +
θ
6
− 1
2
(1 + λ)(p1k + p
2
k)
in the case of two products.
Then introductory prices can be determined sequentially, as the function
of previous introductory prices.15 The outcome of negotiation depends on
the actual state of the markets (drugs on the markets and prices) and on
the nature of the innovation (vertical or horizontal). There are then three
possible cases, when the current level is k.
We also assume that
Assumption 2 P > (1− α) v
(1+λ) .
This amounts to say that the existing drug has replaced some previous
one with a positive price and created a value V1 at least as large as v.
1) First Case: introduction of a new drug in an existing level
(follower).
Here there is a drug i = 1 in the level k with price p1k, and the innovator
introduces another drug i = 2 in the same level. This can occur at level
k = 1 or level k = 2. The consumer’s gain from introduction is for a price p2k
of the new drug:16
·
Vk +
θ
6
− 1
2
(1 + λ)(p1k + p
2
k)
¸
−
£
Vk − (1 + λ)p1k)
¤
=
θ
6
+
1
2
(1 + λ)(p1k − p2k)
15Although there are only two levels k = 1, 2 in the model, we allow here for more levels
(k = 1, ..,K) to highlight the nature of the negotiation process and of the dynamics of
prices.
16Notice that given that demand is not sensitive to price, there is no incentive for the
seller of the existing drug to reduce its price when an entry occurs.
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The profit is now p
2
k
2
as the new drug reaches half of the patients only.
We thus solve the program
max
p2k
µ
θ
6
+
1
2
(1 + λ)(p1k − p2k)
¶αµ
p2k
2
¶1−α
which yields
p2k = (1− α) [p1k +
θ
3(1 + λ)
]
Moreover
p2k < p
1
k whenever
1− α
α
θ
3(1 + λ)
< p1k.
Under our assumptions p1k > (1− α) v1+λ so that this holds provided that
α > θ
3v
, in particular for α > 1
3
.
We see that when the bargaining power of the regulator is high enough,
horizontal innovation leads to a reduction in health expenses from p1k to
p1k + p
2
k
2
=
(2− α) p1k + (1− α) θ3(1+λ)
2
2) Second Case: introduction of a new drug at the superior level
(pioneer) while the current level is incomplete.
Here the first drug in level k + 1 is introduced, while the second drug in
level k is not discovered. According to our assumptions this means that there
is one drug in level k (which sells at price p1k). Then the new drug replaces
the old one.
The consumers’ gain is£
Vk+1 − (1 + λ)p1k+1
¤
−
£
Vk − (1 + λ)p1k)
¤
= v − (1 + λ)(p1k+1 − p1k)
so that we now solve
max
p1k+1
¡
v − (1 + λ)(p1k+1 − p1k)
¢α ¡
p1k+1
¢1−α
.
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The price of the new drug is then
p1k+1 = (1− α)
·
p1k +
v
(1 + λ)
¸
Given that v > θ, when there is only one drug in level k, the innovation
to the superior level leads to an introductory price p1k+1 larger than the
introductory price p2k that would prevail for an horizontal innovation. Thus
a vertical innovation generates higher prices than an horizontal innovation.
Notice also that p12 > P when
1− α
α
v
1 + λ
> P.
However, if the price is high enough, the new drug may be introduced at a
lower price even if there is only one drug active in level 1.
3) Third case: introduction of a new drug at a superior level
(pioneer) while the current level is complete.
The final case is when the first drug in level k + 1 is introduced, while
the second drug in level k has been discovered. There are thus currently two
drugs in level k (which sells at prices p1k and p
2
k) that are replaced by the new
one. The consumers’ gain is given by£
Vk+1 − (1 + λ)p1k+1
¤
−
·
Vk +
θ
6
− (1 + λ)(p
1
k + p
2
k
2
)
¸
= v − θ
6
− (1 + λ)
µ
p1k+1 −
p1k + p
2
k
2
¶
leading to maximize
max
p1k+1
µ
v − θ
6
− (1 + λ)
µ
p1k+1 −
p1k + p
2
k
2
¶¶α ¡
p1k+1
¢1−α
.
The price is then
p1k+1 = (1− α)
"
p1k + p
2
k
2
+
v − θ
6
(1 + λ)
#
.
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We thus have in this case
p12 = (1− α)
"³
1− α
2
´
P +
v − α θ
6
(1 + λ)
#
Vertical innovation raises health expenditures for the given pathology
whenever there are two products in the level 1 and p12 >
p11+p
2
1
2
which amounts
to
p11 + p
2
1
2
<
1− α
α
v − θ
6
(1 + λ)
Or,
P <
(1− α)
α (2− α)
µ
2v
(1 + λ)
− (1 + α)θ
3(1 + λ)
¶
3.2 Bilateral negotiation under reference pricing
We focus on a reference pricing system that has two characteristics. First all
the drugs in the therapeutic class are sold at the same price. In particular,
there are no drugs sold at prices above the oﬃcial price. This corresponds
for instance to the Italian system where the reimbursement is obtained only
if the price is under the cap.17
Second, we maintain the assumption on the bargaining process. The
bargaining is still bilateral between the producer of the new drug and the
regulator. This means two things that are worth being noticed. Despite the
fact that the producers of existing drugs are directly aﬀected by the price
negotiated (since they have to align their price), they are not part of the
process. Thus there will be some incentives to ”expropriate” these producers
by setting a low price. Moreover, the bargaining weights α and 1 − α, are
not aﬀected by the change in the bargaining environment. This fits with
the view of a bargaining process a la Rubinstein (where the parties alternate
oﬀers, and the drug is introduced at the end).
17The fact that drugs prices are identical is not specified by the regulator but is checked
in equilibrium.
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1) First Case: introduction of a new drug in an existing level
(follower).
The consumers’ gain from introduction is
·
Vk +
θ
6
− (1 + λ)p2k
¸
−
£
Vk − (1 + λ)p1k
¤
=
1
6
θ + (1 + λ)(p1k − p2k)
accounting for the fact that after introduction all the drugs in level k are sold
at price p2k.
Solving
max
p2k
µ
1
6
θ + (1 + λ)(p1k − p2k)
¶αµ
p2k
2
¶1−α
yields the price
p2k = (1− α) [p1k +
θ
6(1 + λ)
] < (1− α) [p1k +
θ
3(1 + λ)
]
The follower is thus introduced at a smaller price when there is a single
price for the therapeutic class. The reason is that the marginal benefit for the
regulator of reducing the price is higher because the price reduction applies
to all the drugs in the class. It is thus a ”tougher” negotiator.
2) Second Case: introduction of a new drug at a superior level
(pioneer) while the current level k is incomplete.
The therapeutic class doesn’t change the pricing behavior, as a new level
is reached and there is only one active drug. Consequently, the price is
p1k+1 = (1− α)
·
p1k +
v
(1 + λ)
¸
like in subsection 2.1
3) Third case: introduction of a new drug at a superior level
(pioneer) while the current level is complete (i.e. the second drug in
level k exists).
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Again the new drug takes all the market and the consumers’ gain is given
by
£
Vk+1 − (1 + λ)p1k+1
¤
−
·
Vk +
θ
6
− (1 + λ)(p
2
k
2
)
¸
= v − θ
6
− (1 + λ)
¡
p1k+1 − p2k
¢
We must solve
max
p1k+1
µ
v − θ
6
− (1 + λ)
¡
p1k+1 − p2k
¢¶α ¡
p1k+1
¢1−α
that gives
p1k+1 = (1− α)
"
p2k +
v − θ
6
(1 + λ)
#
Therefore the reference pricing system has no direct eﬀect. However, the
price is lower than in the base case provided that the price of a medication
in the therapeutic class prior to the introduction of the innovation is lower
than the average price that would prevail without reference pricing.
4 The dynamics of innovation
Knowing the prices that will be fixed at the marketing stage depending on
the nature of the drug innovation, we can now solve the innovation game. Be-
cause of the assumption that a vertical innovation is drastic and captures the
whole market, in any equilibrium, all levels will be discovered at some point
in time. Thus, when looking at the dynamics of innovation there remains
two questions. First, in which levels will there be an horizontal innovation?
Second, what are the delays between subsequent innovations?
4.1 Innovation without reference pricing
Given that it is the last level, there will be eventually an horizontal innovation
in level k = 2. The remaining uncertainty is whether there is an horizontal
innovation or not in level 1 (prior to the discovery of the first level-2 drug).
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This may thus yield two types of equilibria, corresponding to two diﬀerent
sequences of innovation.
To summarize, in any case the pioneer is introduced in every levels, and
the follower in the level k = 2 is introduced after some time. The diﬀerence
comes from the follower in level k = 1. We thus define the two sequences:
Sequence 1: The follower of level k = 1 is never introduced. The prices
are then:
p¯12 = (1− α)
·
P +
v
(1 + λ)
¸
for the first drug in level 2;
p¯22 = (1− α)2
·
P +
v
(1 + λ)
¸
+ (1− α) θ
3(1 + λ)
for the last drug.
Sequence 2: The follower of level k = 1 is introduced before the pioneer
of level k = 2. The prices are then:
pˆ21 = (1− α)P + (1− α)
θ
3(1 + λ)
for the second drug in level 1;
pˆ12 = (1− α)
Ã³
1− α
2
´
P +
v − α θ
6
(1 + λ)
!
< p¯12
for the first drug in level 2 ;
pˆ22 = (1− α)
Ã
(1− α)
Ã³
1− α
2
´
P +
v − α θ
6
(1 + λ)
!
+
θ
3(1 + λ)
!
= (1− α)2
³
1− α
2
´
P + (1− α)2 v
(1 + λ)
+ (1− α) (2− α(1− α)) θ
6(1 + λ)
< p¯22 for the last drug.
In what follows we start the game at the date of introduction of the first
drug in level 1.We derive the dynamics of innovation from that point in the
absence of reference pricing. We then consider what occurs if the legislator
impose a regulation built on reference pricing.18
18This means that we implicitely assume that either the legislative change was not
anticipated by the first innovator when choosing the introductory time of the first drug,
or the first innovation is given by an exogeneous process.
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Let us denote τ 2 the delay between the creation of level k = 2 and the
introduction of the follower in level 2. For the sequence 2, we can also denote
τ 1 the time of introduction of the follower in level 1. Let us denote t2 the
delay between the creation of the level 1 and the introduction of the pioneer
into level 2. Notice that the research on the follower and the research on the
next level both start as soon as a pioneer is introduced. Indeed, there is no
advantage from delaying the innovation. In particular in sequence 2, both
t2 and τ 1 start from date 0.
Consider first the situation where the second level exists. The research
focuses on the follower with an investment such that the discounted benefits
are null, that is
ce−γτ2 = e−rτ2
p22
2r
where p
2
2
2r
is the discounted value of serving half of the patients at price p22 for
ever, with discount factor r.We assume that the drugs will be introduced in
level 2 with some delays.
Assumption 3 c > p¯
2
2
2r
; C >
p¯12
2r
; γ > r.
This yields an introductory delay
τ 2 =
1
γ − r
µ
ln (c)− ln
µ
p22
2r
¶¶
.
Consider now the situation where a pioneer has just been introduced in
level 1, and an equilibrium leading to sequence 1 where laboratories focus on
the vertical innovation only. In the vertical-only case, we must have τ 2 = τ¯ 2
and t2 = t¯2 with
ce−(γ−r)τ¯2 =
p¯22
2r
Ce−(γ−r)t¯2 =
p¯12
r
µ
1− e
−rτ¯2
2
¶
=
p¯12
r
Ã
1− 1
2
µ
p¯22
c2r
¶ r
γ−r
!
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Here the formula accounts for the fact that once the drug is introduced, the
seller will benefit from a monopoly position for a period of length τ¯ 2. Thus
t¯2 =
1
γ − r
µ
ln (C)− ln
µ
p¯12
r
µ
1− e
−rτ¯2
2
¶¶¶
=
ln (C)
γ − r −
1
γ − r ln
"
p¯12
r
Ã
1− 1
2
µ
p¯22
c2r
¶ r
γ−r
!#
For this to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that there is no hori-
zon that would yield a positive return on horizontal innovation. Such an
innovation would allow to sell 1
2
at price pˆ21 as long as the new level is not
introduced. Thus it must be the case that for all τ 1 < t¯2 :
ce−γτ1 >
pˆ21
2r
³
e−rτ1 − e−rt¯2
´
Or,
ce−(γ−r)τ1 >
pˆ21
2r
³
1− e−r(t¯2−τ1)
´
This amounts to say that there is no solution ∆ = t¯2 − τ 1 to the above
inequality. Define
Φ(∆) =
ce(γ−r)∆
1− e−r∆ .
The condition of existence writes as
min
[0,t¯2]
Φ(∆) ≥ pˆ
2
1
2r
e(γ−r)t¯2
Lemma 1 There exists a threshold t¯ such that an equilibrium with sequence
1 exists if and only if t¯2 ≤ t¯.
Proof. see Appendix
Notice that t¯ is defined as the solution of
pˆ21
2γ
µ
γ − r
γ
¶γ−r
r
= ce−(γ−r)t¯.
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Consider now the case of sequence 2 where innovators invest both in
vertical and horizontal innovations. The follower is introduced with a delay
τ 1 = τˆ 1 and the next level with a delay t2 = tˆ2 > τˆ 1. As mentioned above,
the firm planning to introduce the next pioneer benefits from starting the
research process immediately instead of waiting for the follower to emerge,
since this minimizes the introductory delay and the follower doesn’t generate
R&D spillover. We then have:
ce−(γ−r)τˆ1 =
pˆ21
2r
³
1− e−r(tˆ2−τˆ1)
´
Ce−(γ−r)tˆ2 =
µ
pˆ12
r
µ
1− e
−rτˆ2
2
¶¶
ce−(γ−r)τˆ2 =
pˆ22
2r
We obtain
tˆ2 =
ln (C)
γ − r −
1
γ − r ln
"
pˆ12
r
Ã
1− 1
2
µ
pˆ22
c2r
¶ r
γ−r
!#
The existence condition is then tˆ2 > τˆ 1. Said diﬀerently, there must exist
a solution ∆ < tˆ2 to
Φ(∆) =
ce(γ−r)∆
1− e−r∆ <
pˆ21
2r
e(γ−r)tˆ2
Lemma 2 There exists an equilibrium with sequence 2 i f and only if tˆ2 > t¯.
Proof. Same as above with revert inequalities.
Let us compare t¯2 and tˆ2.We have
Ce−(γ−r)t¯2 =
p¯12
r

1−
µ
(1−α)[p¯12+
θ
3(1+λ) ]
c2r
¶ r
γ−r
2


Ce−(γ−r)tˆ2 =
pˆ12
r

1−
µ
(1−α)[pˆ12+
θ
3(1+λ) ]
c2r
¶ r
γ−r
2


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Define the function
χ(p) =
p
2r

2−
Ã
(1− α) [p+ θ
3(1+λ) ]
c2r
! r
γ−r


Then t¯2 < tˆ2 whenever χ(p¯12) > χ(pˆ
1
2). For c large enough this holds,
implying that the pioneer emerges faster if there is no horizontal innovation
anticipated. The reason is that introductory prices are smaller if more drugs
are present in the inferior class, the social benefit being smaller. In other
words horizontal innovations delay vertical innovations.
Proposition 3 For c not too small, or for γ > 2r, an equilibrium exists.
Three cases are possible:
• I f tˆ2 ≤ t¯, sequence 1 is the only equilibrium.
• I f t¯2 > t¯, there appears a level-1 follower before the level-2 pioneer.
• I f t¯2 ≤ t¯ < tˆ2, both sequences can emerge in equilibrium.
Proof. see Appendix
4.2 Innovation under a RP regulation
The model is still solved by backward induction, but using now the prices of
subsection 2.2. As before, two equilibria can emerge corresponding to two
diﬀerent sequences of innovation.
Sequence 1: Prices are:
P¯ 12 = p¯
1
2 = (1− α)
·
P +
v
(1 + λ)
¸
;
P¯ 22 = (1− α)2
·
P +
v
(1 + λ)
¸
+ (1− α) θ
6(1 + λ)
.
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Sequence 2: Prices are:
Pˆ 21 = (1− α)P + (1− α)
θ
6(1 + λ)
;
Pˆ 12 = (1− α)
"
(1− α)P + (1− α) θ
6(1 + λ)
+
v − θ
6
(1 + λ)
#
= (1− α)2P + (1− α) v
(1 + λ)
− α (1− α) θ
6(1 + λ)
< P¯ 12 ;
Pˆ 22 = (1− α)Pˆ 12 + (1− α)
θ
6(1 + λ)
= (1− α)3P + (1− α)2 v
(1 + λ)
+ (1− α) (1− α(1− α)) θ
6(1 + λ)
< P¯ 22 .
We partly repeat the discussion that precedes. Denote ςk the introductory
delay of the follower, in class k = {1, 2} , and T2 the delay of introduction of
the pioneer.
The delay for the follower in the second level is given by
ς2 =
1
γ − r
µ
ln (c)− ln
µ
P 22
2r
¶¶
.
Again two equilibria are possible, depending on whether there is or there
is not an innovation in level 1.
When there is no follower in level 1 (sequence 1) we must have (with
similar notations as above)
Ce−(γ−r)T¯2 =
1
r
·¡
1− e−rτ¯2
¢
P¯ 12 +
1
2
e−rτ¯2P¯ 22
¸
ce−(γ−r)ς¯2 =
P¯ 22
2r
The diﬀerence is that after delay ς¯2, the pioneer not only loose half of the
market but its price is reduced to P¯ 22 .
And again this is an equilibrium if there is no solution ∆ to (introducing
a follower is not profitable)
Φ(∆) =
ce(γ−r)∆
1− e−r∆ <
Pˆ 21
2r
e(γ−r)T¯2
between zero and T¯2.
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Lemma 4 There exists a threshold T¯ such that an equilibrium with sequence
1 exists if and only if T¯2 ≤ T¯ .
Proof. Same as for Lemma 1.
In the second case we have delays ς1 = ςˆ1, T2 = Tˆ2 > ςˆ1 and ςˆ2, with
ce−(γ−r)ςˆ1 =
pˆ21
2r
³
1− e−r(Tˆ2−ςˆ1)
´
Ce−(γ−r)Tˆ2 =
1
r
·¡
1− e−rςˆ2
¢
pˆ12 +
1
2
e−rςˆ22 pˆ
2
2
¸
ce−(γ−r)ςˆ2 =
pˆ22
2r
The existence condition is Tˆ2 > ςˆ1, or again there should exists a solution
∆ < Tˆ2 to
Φ(∆) =
ce(γ−r)∆
1− e−r∆ <
pˆ21
2r
e(γ−r)Tˆ2
Lemma 5 There exists an equilibrium with sequence 2 i f and only if Tˆ2 > T¯ .
We have to compare T¯2 and Tˆ2 defined by
Ce−(γ−r)T2 =
1
r
"Ã
1−
µ
P¯ 22
c2r
¶ r
γ−r
!
P¯ 12 +
1
2
µ
P¯ 22
c2r
¶ r
γ−r
P¯ 22
#
Ce−(γ−r)Tˆ2 =
1
r



1−
Ã
Pˆ 22
c2r
! r
γ−r

 Pˆ 12 +
1
2
Ã
Pˆ 22
c2r
! r
γ−r
Pˆ 22


We see that the conclusions are the same as for proposition 3, except that
the thresholds take diﬀerent values.
5 Welfare and health expenditures
The consumers’ welfare is computed using the same discount factor as the
firms r. Denote τ i the delay of introduction of a follower and t2 the delay
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of apparition of the pioneer. If Wt is the consumers’ surplus at date t, as
defined above, the intertemporal surplus is defined as
r
Z ∞
0
Wte
−rtdt
If there were no innovation the intertemporal consumer welfare would be
V1 − (1 + λ)P
Let si be the welfare gain compared to this reference level in sequence i. We
can decompose this gain in two terms: the first-one is related to the gains
in health whereas the second-one captures variations in expenditures. More
precisely, we have
si = hi − (1 + λ)ei
where hi is the aggregate gain in wealth and ei the increase in medical ex-
penditures.
In absence of reference pricing, and when innovation follows a sequence
of type 1 we have
h1 = e
−rt¯2v + e−r(tˆ2+τ¯2)
θ
6
;
e1 =
³
e−rt¯2 − e−r(t¯2+τ¯2)
´ ¡
p¯12 − P
¢
+ e−r(t¯2+τ¯2)
µ
p¯22 + p¯
1
2
2
− P
¶
= e−rt¯2
¡
p¯12 − P
¢
+ e−r(t¯2+τ¯2)(
p¯22 − p¯12
2
)
For sequence 2, we have
h2 = e
−rτˆ1 θ
6
+ e−rtˆ2(v − θ
6
) + e−r(tˆ2+τˆ2)
θ
6
e2 = e
−rτˆ1
µ
pˆ21 − P
2
¶
+ e−rtˆ2
µ
pˆ12 −
P + pˆ21
2
¶
+ e−r(tˆ2+τˆ2)
µ
pˆ22 − pˆ12
2
¶
For the case where the regulator uses therapeutic classes, we obtain sim-
ilar formulas for welfare:
S1 = H1 − (1 + λ)E1
H1 = e
−rT¯2v + e−r(T¯2+ς¯2)
θ
6
E1 = e
−rT¯2
¡
P¯ 12 − P
¢
+ e−r(t¯2+τ¯2)(
P¯ 22 − P¯ 12
2
)
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And,
S2 = H2 − (1 + λ)E2
H2 = e
−rςˆ1 θ
6
+ e−rTˆ2(v − θ
6
) + e−r(Tˆ2+ςˆ2)
θ
6
E2 = e
−rςˆ1
³
Pˆ 21 − P
´
+ e−rTˆ2
³
Pˆ 12 − Pˆ 21
´
+ e−r(tˆ2+τˆ2)
³
Pˆ 22 − Pˆ 21
´
The introduction by the legislator of a RP regulation has two potential
eﬀects:
• First expenses are aﬀected through two channels:
— the new price applies to all drugs when an innovation occurs
— the regulator negotiates diﬀerent prices (lower prices)
• Second, the dynamics of innovation is aﬀected:
— within a sequence, introductory delays changes
— the sequence may change, for instance the follower in level 1 may
be introduced without RP but not with RP .
When the legislator changes the regulatory regime to RP, for a fixed
innovation paths expenses are reduced but the final impact depends on the
eﬀect on innovation. The changes in the pattern of innovation will aﬀect both
the health level and the expenses. Moreover, it is worth noticing that there
may be countervailing eﬀects on expenses due to diﬀerent delays.
As seen above, under reasonable assumptions, horizontal innovations re-
duces total expenses. Thus a delay in the introduction of followers would
be detrimental to expenses. Intuition suggests that RP may generate such
eﬀects, since it raises delays for the follower in level 2, at fixed date of intro-
duction of the level 2 pioneer, it also raises the delay for the follower in level
1.
However the introductory time of the pioneer in level 1 is also aﬀected
in a non-trivial way. Indeed, there are two conflicting eﬀects. On one hand,
the profitability of a pioneer is reduced because its price decreases when the
follower is introduced. On the other hand, the delay of introduction of the
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follower increases, allowing the producer of a pioneer to generate larger sales.
The global eﬀect of imposing RP is thus ambiguous.
Notice that as the prices of followers are smaller with therapeutic classes,
it is true that T¯ > t¯. Everything being equal (t2 fixed in both sequence 1 and
2), the number of followers is smaller with RP, meaning that sequence 2 ap-
pears under more stringent conditions. This suggest that RP may eliminate
the apparition of the follower 1, which we can anticipate having a negative
impact on health expenditures.
The impact on health is ambiguous. On one hand, for a given sequence,
one can expect that RP has a negative impact on health by delaying innova-
tions. On the other hand, moving from sequence 2 to sequence 1 would have
an ambiguous eﬀect as one innovation never occurs and the pioneer occurs
after a smaller length of time.
6 Numerical results
In order to obtain more insight on the impact of the change of regime on the
dynamics of innovation and on consumers welfare, we develop some numerical
simulations. We use the market for statins as a way to benchmark some
parameters of the model and to get some insight on the likely impact of RP
on the dynamics of this type of medicaments.
6.1 The statins
Statins are the most eﬀective drugs to reduce the LDL — cholesterol in blood.
In France, the market for statin was born in 1989 with the introduction of
Simvastatin (20 mg). In the following 15 years, new products have been
regularly introduced. In 2004 there were five available substance, with Sim-
vastatin, Pravastatin (introduced in 1991), Fluvastatin (introduced in 1996),
Atorvastatin (introduce in 1998) and Rosuvastatin (introduced in 2004). The
first generic appeared in year 2005, and should be followed by another one
(for Pravastatin) in year 2006. Each substance is now available in 2 to 4
dosages.19
19We than Pfizer France and Jean-François Guichard for providing these data. Prices
are for a 4 weeks treatment. Percentage reduction are derived from Etude BMJ
2003.326.7404.1423 par MR Law, NJ Wald et AR Rudnicka, ‘Quantifying eﬀect of statins
on LDL cholesterol, ischaemic heart disease and stroke : systematic review and meta-
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These molecules have diﬀerent performance levels, in particular in term of
percentage reduction achieved for a given daily dose. They also diﬀer on the
nature of the secondary eﬀect generated by each molecule, but we don’t have
data on this aspect. For a daily dose of 20mg, the mean percentage reduction
in "bad" cholesterol achieved are 32 % for Simvastatin, 24 % for Pravastatin,
21 % for Fluvastatin and 43 % for Atorvastatin. The last drug, Rosuvastatin
obtains a reduction of 48 %. Diﬀerences are significant at a 95% confidence
interval, except between Pravastatin and Fluvastatin, and Atorvastatin. and
Rosuvastatin. Similar patterns occur for higher doses (40mg or 80mg).
This shows a clear diﬀerence between the first three molecules and the
last two. Indeed this diﬀerence has allowed the producers of Atorvastatin and
Rosuvastatin to launch products at daily doses of 10mg, while the others stay
above 20mg. The corresponding reductions in cholesterol are 37 % and 43 %,
above the level achieved by the others at 20%.
The expansion in the supply came along with a very rapid growth of statin
consumption. In economic terms, if we add all product together, the sales
value grew at more than 17 % per year over the period, despite of regular
price reductions. The average growth rate during the last 4 years, is still at 15
%. Even the oldest drug (Simvastatin 20mg) continues being sold in growing
quantities, despite the fact that it now suﬀers from the concurrence of other
statins on the market. There has been in fact an extraordinary growth of
the demand for statins, which benefited to all statins, and which is also the
source of an increase of expenditure for the health care system in France.
In figure 1 we depict the evolutions of market shares of each molecule.
The market share have been changing very importantly over time (see Figure
1). Simvastatin, the first statin to be introduced remained leader until 2000
where it lost the first position to Pravastatin and Atorvastatin. Fluvastatin
has expanded very little, and Rosuvastatin still has a very short history. For
most substance there is dosage that appears much more popular than the
others and that sell about twice as much as the second dosage of the same
substance.
Prices went down along all the period. Simvastatin 20mg which was
first sold at 30,05 Euros is no sold at 19,34. The other drugs experimented
similar decline (see the table in figure 2). A particularity of the market, is
that entrants were market at price that were lower than those of older drugs,
even if they were recognized to have a greater eﬃciency. This is the case for
analysis’
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example of Atorvastatin 10mg which was first sold at 20.62, and was then
therefore cheaper than the oldest Pravastatin and Simvastatin, although it
is known for generating greater a decrease in cholesterol.
6.2 Simulations
We use the above data to get some insights on relevant parameters. First
as pointed above Fluvastatin had only a marginal impact on the market,
and Rosuvastatin just emerges. We thus decided to focus on the three main
medicaments, Simvastatin, Pravastatin and Atorvastatin. In each molecule
some dose seems to be determinant, in particular 20mg doses for the first
two are largely dominant. From the data above, we decided to include the
first two molecules in one level, and to classify Atorvastatin as a vertical
innovation as defined in our model.
Our model has little to say about volumes and in any case demand in
increasing over time.20 So we use prices as a benchmark. We face however
a diﬃculty because molecules are available at diﬀerent doses and we don’t
know which is the relevant one. Should we consider Atorvastatin at 10mg
which is above but not too far from Simvastatin 20mg in terms of reduction in
cholesterol, or is it the dose that matters under our modelling assumptions
in case we should consider Atorvastatin at 20mg. Given that tolerance is
related to doses, we opted for the second option.
The second issue relates to the fact that we observe a general trend in
decreasing prices that is not accounted for in the model. This means that we
can not directly compare directly introductory prices. To avoid the issue we
choose the prices of a given year as a benchmark, namely 2004.
The data thus corresponds to a sequence of type 1 with an horizontal
innovation in level 1. We have 3 prices available namely 20.75 for Simvastatin,
18.92 for Pravastatin and 32.76 for Atorvastatin. Prices allow to calibrate the
equation of bargaining between the regulators and the innovator. However for
prices, 3 parameters matter α, v
1+λ ,
θ
1+λ . We thus calibrated the last two as
a function of α.We present the predicted prices for each possible trajectories
for α = 0.2. patterns are similar for other values:
20Notice that our model can easily accomodate a time trend in demand, but adjusting
the discount factor. Indeed increasing demand is formally equivalent to reducing δ.
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α = 0.2 p21 p
1
2 p
2
2
no RP 18.92 32.76 28.52
RP seq 1 − 34.65 28.9
RP seq 2 17.76 31.10 26.04
Notice that prices are higher under sequence 1, due to the disappearance
of the first innovation.
Delays are more diﬃcult to interpret as in the model we ignore the in-
trinsic randomness of innovation. In the data we have a delay of 9 years for
the vertical innovation, and 2 and 6 years for an horizontal innovation, so an
average of 3 years. In our model τˆ 2 < τˆ 1 which is not the case in the data.
This may be due to randomness and/or to external eﬀects such as the defla-
tionary trend. We set γ = 0.5 and we do not calibrate the costs parameters c
and C but rather check that predicted innovation delays are consistent with
observed patterns. For various value of α we adjust these costs to generate
various scenarios. All our results have pointed to the same conclusions.
We present below the predicted trajectories for various scenarios. We
also computed the discounted consumers’ surplus (the term h or H in the
surplus) and the discounted expenses (the term e or E). More precisely we
computed the change in the benefits for consumers and in expenses compared
to a situation with no innovation at all.
We summarize the results below
α = 0.2 τ 1 or ς1 t2 or T2 τ 2 or ς2 health expenses
no RP 4.8 11.4 0.73 20.11 6.13
RP 4.96 11.5 0.93 20.02 4.71
no RP 7.14 9.64 1.13 21.31 6.73
RP NO 9.52 1.1 21.28 7.61
α = 0.4 τ 1 or ς1 t2 or T2 τ 2 or ς2 health expenses
no RP 5.1 10.76 0.93 39.49 5.58
RP 5.65 10.9 1.36 39.1 3.06
no RP 7.06 10.3 1.78 39.54 5.82
RP NO 10.06 1.86 39.26 7.03
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α = 0.6 τ 1 or ς1 t2 or T2 τ 2 or ς2 health expenses
no RP 4.82 9.91 0.65 79.83 4.98
RP 6.01 10.02 1.32 78.57 1.88
no RP 5.88 9.86 1.22 79.11 5.09
RP NO 9.49 1.52 78.12 6.39
From the simulation we conclude that
1. The RP system tend to delay innovations. The only case where this
not the case is when the level 1 innovation disappears and the pioneer
arrives sooner.
2. In all cases, the RP system has a negative impact on health surplus
3. The system reduces expenses when the trajectory of innovation is not
aﬀected due to lower prices and less innovations.
4. But it raises expenses when some innovation is discouraged.
The global welfare eﬀect will depend on the weight put on expenses rel-
ative to health. In any case it is negative when the trajectory changes.
7 Conclusions and extensions
The model allows to emphasize the interaction between the pricing policy
constrained by various forms of regulation and the eﬀort of innovation by
pharmaceutical laboratories. We have identified antagonist eﬀects of the
regulation by means of the RP regulation: a decrease in price due to the pro-
duction of followers reduces the incentives to create pioneer drugs; inversely,
the introduction of followers is delayed, which gives positive incentives to
launch pioneers. Consequently, the net eﬀect of the uniform pricing rule
within a class is ambiguous. However, it remains possible to obtain explicit
solutions through numerical simulations.
Simulations show that the dynamic impact on the health of the population
is negative due to less innovation, while the impact on expenses is ambiguous.
What appears is that by favouring pioneer innovations at the expense of
cost reducing innovations, the regulation may generate a medium/long run
increase in expenses, despite potential short-run benefits.
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In the model developed so far, we have introduced several drastic hy-
pothesis in order to obtain a first analytical friendly framework. The next
step will be to test how robust the results are when these simplifications are
relaxed. Here are some examples.
i) The patient is fully reimbursed for all health expenses. This seems
relevant for most European countries where demand shows little sensitivity to
price for many treatments. The coverage may come from the social security
system, or from private insurance contracts. It will have to (and can) be
relaxed latter on.
ii) Prices are negotiated in our model, which is natural with 100% cover-
age. In many countries prices can freely be set above reimbursed levels. We
should extend the model to allow for competitive pricing by the firms.
iii) We have adopted a deterministic innovation model according to which
the laboratory chooses the time devoted to develop the new product. The
extended version of the model should allow for random innovation technolo-
gies. In particular, we can use a random innovation process based on the
Poisson law determining the instantaneous probability of discovery.
iv) The last point implies that the model does not allow for the coexistence
on the market of drugs known for their large eﬃciency along with less eﬃcient
and less costly medications.21
v) We have ignored the potential moral hazard issues that may emerge
during the course of the relationship between patients and doctors22. Doc-
tors, after examination of the patients, could use their private information
in a selfish manner.23
vi) We have ruled out pharmaceutical groups that produce several drugs
and would internalize the eﬀect of a new drug on the profitability of their
portfolio. At the level of details that corresponds to the concept of therapeu-
tic equivalence, this seems a reasonable assumption as groups tend to have
only one molecule in a would-be class.
vii) The regulator maximizes the consumers’ surplus net of the social
cost of health expenditures. Moreover, the regulator is myopic, meaning
that he only takes into account the current surplus and ignores the impact
21This assumption is consistent with the model if the ranking between drugs is not
uniform for all patients. Alternatively one could introduce marketing strategies.
22The so-called induced demand.
23Relaxing these assumptions may also allow to leave some room for advertising. The
marketing strategies of pharmaceutical groups include both an informative dimension and
a persuasive one (see for instance Hurwitz and Caves [1988]).
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of the current prices on future prices and the innovation process. These
assumptions allow to isolate the negotiation of prices from the innovation
process 24.
vii) Each innovation is supposed to be protected by an unchallenged
patent of infinite duration. The model can be extended to fix the patent
duration and to handle the problem of generic products.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The slope of the function Φ is:
Φ0(∆) = Φ(∆)
µ
γ − r
1− e−r∆
¶
.
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Φ is quasi-convex with a minimum
Φ =
cγ
³
γ−r
γ
´−γ−r
r
r
at ∆ = −
ln(1− rγ )
r
> 0
By assumption 3, we have
Φ >
pˆ21
2r
e(γ−r)∆.
As the function decreases on (0,Φ) , Φ(∆) > pˆ
2
1
2r
e(γ−r)t¯2 for all ∆ ≤ t¯2 < ∆.
Thus the equilibrium exists if pˆ
2
1
2r
e(γ−r)t¯2 ≤ Φ. This closes the proof.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. An equilibrium exists for all values of t¯ if t¯2 < tˆ2.
χ0(p) =
1
2r

2−
Ã
(1− α) [p+ θ
3(1+λ) ]
c2r
! r
γ−r


− p
2r
Ã
r
γ − r
µ
1− α
c2r
¶ r
γ−r
µ
p+
θ
3(1 + λ)
¶ r
γ−r−1
!
2rχ0(p) = 2−
Ã
1 +
p
p+ θ
3(1+λ)
µ
r
γ − r
¶!Ã
(1− α) [p+ θ
3(1+λ) ]
c2r
! r
γ−r
χ(p) is concave. For c large it is increasing in the relevant range. By
assumption 3
2rχ0(p) > 2−
Ã
1 +
p
p+ θ
3(1+λ)
µ
r
γ − r
¶!
> 1− p
p+ θ
3(1+λ)
µ
r
γ − r
¶
>
p
³
γ−2r
γ−r
´
+ θ
3(1+λ)
p+ θ
3(1+λ)
This is positive for γ > 2r for any price.
When χ is increasing the results follows from p¯12 > pˆ
1
2.
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